- Volume 1
- Volume 2
-
Volume 3
- Introduction
- Methodology
- Social and demographic profile of witnesses
- Circumstances of admission
- Family contact
- Everyday life experiences (male witnesses)
- Record of abuse (male witnesses)
- Everyday life experiences (female witnesses)
- Record of abuse (female witnesses)
- Positive memories and experiences
- Current circumstances
- Introduction to Part 2
- Special needs schools and residential services
- Children’s Homes
- Foster care
- Hospitals
- Primary and second-level schools
- Residential Laundries, Novitiates, Hostels and other settings
- Concluding comments
- Volume 4
Chapter 3 — Gateways
BackNon-attendance at school
A major issue was the fact that it was a court which was selected as the agency through which children and young persons were directed to a reformatory or an industrial school. Historically, the reason for this seems to have been the simple, human rights point that, given the significant deprivation of liberty involved, it would have been inappropriate if this important decision had been vested in, for example, a local health authority. However, the court was known to the residents themselves, and everyone else, principally as a place in which minor criminal offences were tried. The inevitable result was that those committed were unfairly stigmatised as criminals whereas, in fact, their only ‘crime’ was poverty. The fundamental unfairness of this was raised consistently by witnesses before the Commission.
In addition, most of the usual safeguards which are the hallmark of the adult criminal justice system were denied to those whom a court was considering sending to an industrial school. There was next to no legal representation, and the facts relied on by the Garda/ISPCC Inspector/SAO were seldom contested, so that the issue of whether they had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt scarcely arose. Although there was an appeal process, it was seldom used.
Although some ex-staff members stated that they did not like this method of committal, there is considerable evidence, both from documents and oral testimony, that children committed to these schools were seen as being criminals by staff, and that a lot of the mistreatment experienced by the children emanated from this perception. Staff recalled that even very young children remembered appearing in court and talked about it among themselves. The general view was that committal through the courts was logical only if the schools were regarded as places of detention. In England, the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933 had established a radical distinction. It confined the courts’ involvement with children or juveniles to those who were accused of an offence.
The Courts of Justice Act, 1924 made provision for the setting-up of Children’s Courts in separate buildings, in Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Waterford. However, only one such court came into being, in Dublin:17 the Dublin Metropolitan Children’s Court, which was established in 1923.
The case for committal of a child was presented to the court by an Inspector of the ISPCC, who was also colloquially known as the ‘cruelty man’, or less often by the Catholic Protection and Rescue Society, or by an SAO or a Garda (depending on which ground was being relied upon).
The main factor shaping the procedure was that the child was almost always unrepresented. A parent (or guardian) was required by law to be present, and the mother frequently appeared before the court. The parent was usually uneducated and, in an age of deference, dominated by the circumstances of the proceedings. They were unlikely to be able to make the best of any case against committal. As regards facts, the evidence of the ISPCC Inspector or the SAO was seldom contested.
The schools deplored the reluctance of District Justices to make committals or, alternatively, to do so before an offender had committed so many crimes that a school would have no rehabilitative effect on him. In the 1960s, they complained, too, that committals were for too short a period for any good to be done. There were fundamentally different understandings of the objectives and potentials of the school. Some District Justices seem to have disapproved of the schools as places of ‘containment’, to which children were to be sent only as a last resort. By contrast, the schools themselves, or at least the managers speaking in public, would claim that the schools were primarily educational not penal institutions, which could be successful in educating a child and saving him or her from a life of crime or misery. The Managers18 claimed, too, that the District Justices’ view had the potential to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, since it meant that only ‘incorrigibles’ would be sent to the schools.
The number of adjournments which were granted before the committal was actually made suggested a judicial reluctance to commit.
Of equal importance with the numbers involved was the length of time for which each child was committed.
For reformatories, the ‘period of detention’ was laid down as not less than two, or more than four, years,19 or in any case not beyond the age of 19.20 In practice, the period of actual detention was usually about one year, provided that the offender’s behaviour and home circumstances were satisfactory.21
The position in regard to industrial schools was more complicated. As regards the children committed by the courts, the almost invariable practice was to commit until the age of 16. The legislation22 appeared to allow the court some discretion in committing children. Nevertheless, up to the 1960s in the thousands of cases which have been checked, in both the Dublin County Borough and provincial courts, the District Justice always made the order apply right up to the time when the child would be 16 years.
Given that committal was until 16 years, the length of time for which any child or young person was committed by a court depended on their age at the time of committal. It is significant that those children who were committed for being ‘needy’ were often committed at very tender years. Thus, they had to reside for many years in both a junior industrial school and senior industrial school.
The net result was striking. In the case of a reformatory school, an offender was sent away usually for about one year (which was in line with a normal criminal sanction). By contrast, for committal to an industrial school, the age of release was fixed at 16 years, and the length of the committal period varied depending on the age of the child at the date of committal. The justification offered for this anomaly was that committal was seen not as a punishment but as a period for which the child or young person needed protection (or education), until they were old enough to fend for themselves. In any case, the reality comes through in the following Dáil exchange: Deputy Dillon: “May I bespeak the good offices of the Minister with special reference to this category of children so that they will not be left permanently in industrial schools ...?”. J Lynch: “... the word ‘permanently’ might create a wrong impression. They would all be entitled to be released at 14 years of age. For the purposes of childhood, that is surely permanently”. (DD: vol 166, col 779)
These figures varied slightly from decade to decade; however, the average committal period for the period from 1951 to 1960 was: ‘needy’: 8.8 years school non-attendance: 4.2 years offences: 4.1 years.
Children were occasionally removed from school by their parents without the consent of the Minister for Education or the school. For example, some just failed to return from holidays; some parents removed their children from the jurisdiction; and some absconded.
Footnotes
- Section 44 of the Children Act, 1908 (as amended by section 6 of the Children Act, 1941) defines ‘child’ as one under the age of 15 (originally 14); and a ‘young person’ as one between the ages of 15 and 17 (originally 14 and 16). This is pursuant to section 57(1) of the Children Act, 1908 as amended by section 9 of the Children Act, 1941. The umbrella term ‘young offenders’ comprehends any offenders between the ages of seven and 21 years.
- Later re-enacted in section 10(1)(d) of the Children Act, 1941.
- The full wording of section 10(1)(e) of the 1941 Act was as follows:
- ‘Provided also that the Court shall not make an order that a child be sent to a certified industrial school on the grounds stated in paragraph (h) unless—
- (i) the child’s parents consent or his surviving parent or, in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother consents to such order being made, or
- (ii) the Court is satisfied that owing to mental incapacity or desertion on the part of the child’s parents or his surviving parent or, in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, the consent of such parents or parent may be dispensed with, or
- (iii) one of the child’s parents consents to such order being made and the Court being satisfied that, owing to mental incapacity or desertion on the part of the other parent or to the fact that the other parent is undergoing imprisonment or penal servitude, the consent of that parent may be dispensed with’.
- Section 58(3) of the Children Act, 1908 as amended by section 10(2) of the Children Act, 1941.
- Section 57(2) of the Children Act, 1908 as amended by section 9(2) of the Children Act, 1941.
- Kennedy Report, p 1.
- See chapter on St Joseph’s, Kilkenny.
- Section 65(a) of the Children Act, 1908 as amended by section 11(1) of the Children Act, 1941.
- Section 65(a) of the Children Act, 1908.
- Section 58(3) of the Children Act, 1908.
- See sections 57 and 58(3) of the Children Act, 1908.
- Annual Figures for the JLO for 1968–2003 are given in O’Donnell, O’Sullivan and Healy (eds), Crime and Punishment in Ireland 1922 to 2003: A statistical Sourcebook (IPA, 2005), Table 5.3.
- What follows is a paraphrase of section 107 of the 1908 Act where the available sanctions are summarised. Section 107 states:
- ‘Where a child or young person charged with any offence is tried by any court, and the court is satisfied of his guilt, the court shall take into consideration the manner in which, under the provisions of this or any other Act enabling the court to deal with the case, the case should be dealt with, namely, whether—
- (a) by dismissing the charge; or
- (b) by discharging the offender on his entering into a recongizance; or
- (c) by so discharging the offender and placing him under the supervision of a probation officer; or
- (d) by committing the offender to the care of a relative or other fit person; or
- (e) by sending the offender to an industrial school; or
- (f) by sending the offender to a reformatory school; or
- (g) by ordering the offender to be whipped; or
- (h) by ordering the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs; or
- (i) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs; or
- (j) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to give security for his good behaviour ...’.
- Section 17(4)(a) and (b) of the School Attendance Act, 1926.
- Section 17 of the School Attendance Act, 1926 states:
- ‘(1) Whenever a parent fails or neglects to cause his child to whom this Act applies to attend school in accordance with this Act and, so far as is known to the enforcing authority of the school attendance area in which the child resides, there is no reasonable excuse for such failure or neglect, such enforcing authority shall serve on such parent a warning in the prescribed form ...
- (2) If a parent does not comply with a warning duly served on him under this section, he shall, unless he satisfies the Court that he has used all reasonable efforts to cause the child to attend school in accordance with the Act, be guilty of an offence under this section ...
- (4) If in any proceedings against a parent under this section the parent satisfies the court that he has used all reasonable efforts to cause the child to whom the proceedings relate to attend school in accordance with this Act or the parent is convicted of a second or subsequent offence under this section in respect of the same child, the court if it thinks fit may—
- (a) order the child to be sent to a certified industrial school ...’.
- SI 105/1972: School Attendance Act, 1926 (Extension of Application) Order, 1972 raised the school leaving age from 14 to 15.
- Section 80 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924.
- ‘Managers’ was the term used under the 1908 Act. This later became more commonly referred to as ‘resident manager’.
- Section 65(a) of the Children Act, 1908 as amended by section 11(1) of the Children Act, 1941.
- Originally (under the 1908 Act) this was three to five years. However, the 1941 Act reduced this period from two to four years. It also raised the upper age limit of committal to a reformatory from 16 to 17 years, and reduced the period of detention, after which managers could release on licence, from 18 to six months.
- In The Irish Press 27th June 1967, Joseph O’Malley gives the eventual average length of stay in Daingean Reformatory as about 15 months.
- Section 65(b) of the Children Act, 1908 states:
- ‘The detention order shall specify the time for which the youthful offender or child is to be detained in the school, being— ... in the case of a child sent to an industrial school, such time as to the court may seem proper for the teaching and training of the child, but not in any case extending beyond the time when the child will, in the opinion of the court, attain the age of sixteen years’.
- Section 69(1) of the Children Act, 1908 states:
- ‘The [Minister] may at any time order a youthful offender or a child to be discharged from a certified school, either absolutely or on such conditions as the [Minister] approves ...’.
- Section 5 of the Children (Amendment) Act, 1957, which superseded the 1908 Act provision, in the case of children committed under [section 58 of 1908 Act], stated:
- ‘(1) Where—
- (a) a child has been committed to an industrial school under section 58 of the Principal Act, and
- (b) an application is made to the Minister for Education by a parent or guardian for the release of the child, and
- (c) the Minister is satisfied that the circumstances which led to the making of the committal order have ceased and are not likely to recur if the child is released, and that the parent or guardian is able to support the child, the Minister shall order the discharge of the child.
- (2) The Minister may, if he so thinks proper, refer the application to the court.
- (3) If the Minister refuses the application, the parent or guardian may refer it to the court.
- (4) The court, if satisfied in regard to the matters referred to in paragraph (c) of subsection (1), shall have jurisdiction to order the discharge of the child.
- (5) A reference to the court under this section shall be made to the District Court in the District in which the committal order was made or, if the applicant resides in another District, in that District.
- (6) The order for the discharge of the child, whether made by the Minister or the court, shall operate to revoke the detention order.
- (7) (a) Where the District Court or, on appeal, the Circuit Court, orders the discharge of a child, the court may award costs and expenses to the successful applicant ...’.
- This provision was introduced in response to the Doyle case discussed at Appendix, para (iii).
- Doyle v Minister for Education. The case was decided in 1956 but not reported until 1989 at [1989] ILRM 277. The Supreme Court decided that, because of the wording of Article 42.1 of the Constitution, the right of parents to raise their children was inalienable and could not be transferred to the State, even with the consent of parents.
- Kennedy Report, p 6.
- Section 56 (2) of the Health Act, 1953 states that:
- ‘Where a health authority have sent a child to a school approved of by the Minister, the authority—
- (a) may at any time, with the consent of the Minister, remove the child from the school, and
- (b) shall remove the child from the school if and when required so to do by the Minister or by the managers of the school, or upon the school ceasing to be approved of by the Minister’.
- Section 55(1) of the Health Act, 1953.
- Section 55(1) and (2) of the Health Act, 1953.